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WATER POLICY AND WATER INSTITUTIONS
IN NORTHERN INDIA:
THE CASE OF GROUNDWATER RIGHTS*
TERRENCE S. VEEMAN**
ABSTRACT
This paper examines groundwater problems which are emerging in
northern India as a consequence of the green revolution. These prob-
lems are intrinsically related to the nature of the existing system of
groundwater rights and the lack of other groundwater institutions.
The economic performance of groundwater rights is analyzed and
policy suggestions for the revision of groundwater rights and the
promulgation of groundwater regulations are made. In particular, the
correlative rights doctrine (a common property-related institution)
may be useful in the solution of emerging groundwater problems in
northern India.
INTRODUCTION
The problems of water supply, water control, and water distribu-
tion are currently of particular significance in foodgrain production
and agricultural development in India and many other developing
nations.1 Increased investment in groundwater and greater use of
this resource which underlies the Indo-Gangetic plain have been asso-
ciated with the wider use of the new cereal varieties, particularly
wheat, in northern India. Due to economic, technological, and insti-
tutional factors, the traditional and low-capacity groundwater econ-
omy based on shallow dug wells and Persian wheels has been increas-
*This paper is based to a considerable extent on part of the author's doctoral thesis,
Economic Consequences and Policy Implications of the "Green Revolution" in India with
Particular Emphasis on Water Resources Policy in Punjab (unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Univer-
sity of California, Berkeley, 1975). The author gratefully acknowledges the guidance of S.
V. Ciriacy-Wantrup and the financial support of the Rockefeller Foundation for field re-
search in India. Responsibility for any shortcomings in the paper, however, rests with the
author.
**Associate Professor of Economics and Agricultural Economics, The University of
Alberta.
1. Yet, as Schultz observes, "the economics of water for Asian agriculture is still in its
infancy despite the long history of investment in irrigation and drainage in populous parts of
Asia." See T. Schultz, Production Opportunities in Asian Agriculture: An Economist's
Agenda, reprinted in INDIAN SOCIETY OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS, AGRICUL-
TURAL DEVELOPMENT IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES-COMPARATIVE EXPERI-
ENCE 359 (1971).
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ingly replaced by a system of deeper bored wells and mechanized
pumping. Over time, in the absence of contravening policy, further
substitution by even deeper mechanically drilled wells and more
advanced pumpsets can be anticipated. Furthermore, based on ex-
perience from groundwater use in other parts of the world and in
India itself, problems of interdependence among pumpers and, in the
long run, secular depletion of the resource are likely to occur.'
The groundwater resource, therefore, poses special problems for
public policy and management. These problems are intrinsically re-
lated to the nature of the existing system of groundwater rights and
the lack of other adequate groundwater institutions in northern
India. This paper utilizes a number of conceptual approaches in anal-
yzing these emerging groundwater problems and examines the ques-
tion of whether these problems are due to the alleged common prop-
erty nature of the resource. Policy implications with respect to the
revision of groundwater rights and the regulation of groundwater are
drawn. It will be argued that common property institutions-in fact,
a system of correlative rights which is based on the common prop-
erty concept-can be helpful in the solution of groundwater prob-
lems in northern India.3
THE PROBLEM: THE IMPACT OF THE GREEN REVOLUTION ON THE
AGRICULTURE AND WATER SECTORS IN NORTHERN INDIA
The Indian food grain problem is one of long standing. The green
revolution has not fundamentally altered the post-independence rate
of growth of either Indian food grain production or yield, yet it has
created a need for a more adequate and better controlled water
supply for food grain production.4 The new cereal varieties have had
important effects on foodgrain production in India. In particular, the
high-yielding varieties of Mexican semi-dwarf wheat have led to a
structural change in the production of wheat in India and in the
northern state of Punjab.' The new cereal technology is essentially a
technology for irrigated agriculture and its full potential is seriously
constrained by the limited availability of irrigated land with suffi-
2. Ciriacy-Wantrup, Natural Resources in Economic Growth: The Role of Institutions
and Policies, 51 AM. J. AGRICULTURAL ECON. 1314 (1969).
3. Ciriacy-Wantrup & Bishop, "Common Property" as a Concept in Natural Resources
Policy, 15 NAT. RES. J. 713 (1975).
4. For a discussion of this issue with respect to canal irrigation, see Reidinger, !nstitu-
tional Rationing of Canal Water in Northern India: Conflict between Traditional Patterns
and Modern Needs, 23 ECON. DEV. & CULTURAL CHANGE 79 (1974).
5. See Veeman, supra initial note and Veeman, Indian Foodgrain Performance, 2 FOOD
POL'Y 168-171 (1977) for more detail on the nature and impact of the green revolution in
the Indian context.
[Vol. 18
WATER POLICY AND WATER INSTITUTIONS
cient water and adequate water control. Groundwater development
and use, primarily through private investment by farmers and espe-
cially in northern India, has sharply increased under the impact of
the green revolution.6
In Punjab, for example, groundwater draft was estimated to have
reached approximately nine million acre-feet by 1976. This draft,
nearly all for agricultural use, was somewhat less than the flow com-
ponent of the groundwater resource or annual average recharge,
roughly estimated at twelve million acre-feet. It, however, was sus-
pected to be drawing close to the usable portion of annual recharge
which is recharged to non-saline aquifers. The stock component of
the ground water resource had not been estimated but was thought
to be very large. There is mounting evidence, therefore, that ground-
water use in Punjab (and in the western districts of Uttar Pradesh)
may soon exceed average annual recharge and impinge on the stock
component of the resource. In addition, crude projections of future
water use point to the conclusions that eventually the development
of intensive, double-cropped irrigated agriculture will be retarded and
that groundwater overdraft will occur in Punjab.' Furthermore, as
groundwater development increases in importance and groundwater
and surface water switch from being substitutes to complements in
demand, the integration of the development and use of groundwater
and surface waters becomes imperative.8
In the Punjab region and elsewhere in northern India, ground-
water problems are emerging which require the development of
appropriate policy and the design of effective institutions for their
6. The number of tubewells in India increased from 100,000 in 1965 to 1,000,000 in
1975; during the same period, the number of electric and diesel pumpsets increased from
900,000 to 4,750,000, J. Jain, India: Underground Water Resources (paper presented at
Symposium on Resource Development in Semi-Arid Lands organized by the Royal Society
of England, London (1976)). According to the recently released agricultural census, wells
and tubewells were the source of irrigation for 39.5 percent of the net irrigated area in India
in 1970-71; the four northern states of Punjab, Hayana, Uttar Pradesh, and Bihar accounted
for 94 percent of the area under tubewell irrigation Agricultural Census, 66 EASTERN
ECONOMIST 33 (1976). In Punjab, the region which was intensively studied during the
field research on which this paper is based, the share of net area irrigated from ground water
sources increased from 40 percent in 1964-65 to approximately 55 percent in the early
1970's. About 85 percent of ground water in Punjab is pumped through private sources
whereas about 15 percent is pumped through public or state tubewells, Veeman, supra
initial note, at 158.
7. For example, the potential combined surface and ground water supply of 26 million
acre feet would appear to meet only approximately one-half the annual water needs for
irrigated agriculture if Punjab farmers attempted to grow two irrigated crops per year on 8.5
million acres, assuming a water requirement of three feet per acre.
8. S. Ciiacy-Wantrup, Conceptual Problems in Projecting the Demand for Land and
Water (Giannini Foundation Paper No. 176, Berkeley, California Agricultural Experiment
Station, 1959).
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solution. For example, groundwater use by one farmer is beginning
to have an effect on nearby users. Although the problem of localized
well interference, particularly for farmers with shallow tubewells in
poor aquifers, was not widespread in the early 1970's, it was begin-
ning to concern irrigation officials. Moreover, the water table in the
Punjab in the late 1960's and early 1970's was slowly receding-an
indication that some form of overdraft might be occurring.
It is to the analysis of these emerging groundwater problems that
the paper now turns. Central to this analysis is the question of the
nature and the economic performance of the existing system of prop-
erty rights in groundwater in northern India.
GROUNDWATER: COMMON PROPERTY OR FUGITIVE RESOURCE?
There is currently renewed interest, much controversy, and con-
siderable ambiguity regarding conceptual and policy issues relating to
natural resource property rights. 9 Ever since the seminal work of
Scott Gordon on the fisheries,1 0 it has been conventional for econo-
mists to regard resources such as groundwater as so-called common
property resources.
Unfortunately, the term "common property" is applied too
widely, imprecisely, and inaccurately to extremely heterogeneous
types of resources and property rights situations.' 1 Such conceptual
and terminological confusion may be a serious barrier to analytical
understanding of specific resource problems and to the design of
public policy."2 This is the case with groundwater in northern India.
The study of groundwater problems and policy in northern India is
further complicated by lack of documentation and agreement con-
cerning the precise nature and status of property rights in ground-
water.
Water legislation in northern India is essentially based on British
common law.' I There are no explicit statements or acts in Punjab,
9. Recent contributions to this literature include: Symposium on Natural Resource Prop-
erty Rights, 15 NAT. RES. J. 639-797 (1975); and THE GOVERNANCE OF COMMON
PROPERTY RESOURCES (E. Haefele ed. 1974).
10. Gordon, The Economic Theory of a Common Property Resource: The Fishery, 62 J.
POL. ECON. 124 (1954).
11. Ciriacy-Wantrup & Bishop, supra note 3 and Dorfman, The Technical Basis for Deci-
sion Making in THE GOVERNANCE OF COMMON PROPERTY RESOURCES, supra note
9, at 5.
12. Ciriacy-Wantrup, The Economics of Environmental Policy, 47 LAND ECON. 36
(1971).
13. For further brief expositions, see UNITED NATIONS, DEPARTMENT OF ECO-
NOMIC AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS, ABSTRACTION AND USE OF WATER: A COMPARI-
SON OF LEGAL RIGIMES 45-49 (1972); and UNITED NATIONS, ECONOMIC COMMIS-
SION FOR ASIA AND THE FAR EAST, WATER LEGISLATION IN ASIA AND THE
FAR EAST, Part 2, 77-81 (1968).
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for example, which clearly recognize and define the respective sec-
tors of public rights and private rights in either surface or ground-
water. The public ownership of surface water is implied, however, in
regulations governing the use of water as outlined in the Northern
India Canal and Drainage Act of 1873.14 The distribution of canal
water for agricultural use is accomplished through a rotational turn
system known as warabandi.' I Although the rotational turn-the
farmer's claim to so many hours of irrigation time on the canal
outlet-has many characteristics of a water right, it is not, strictly
speaking, a legal right. Otherwise, the right to use surface water not
subject to state diversion is a riparian right which is based on the
ownership of land contiguous to the stream.
The rights of ownership and the rights of use of groundwater in
northern India are much less clearly outlined than in the case of
surface waters. Groundwater has never been declared to be publicly
owned nor is public ownership implied through the operation of the
various state tubewell acts which merely provide for the construc-
tion, improvement, and maintenance of state tubewell irrigation
works.' 6 The system of groundwater rights which prevails in India is
best characterized as a version of the English doctrine of absolute
ownership,' as an Indian farmer currently has an unrestricted right
to make use of groundwater on his overlying land. While the unre-
stricted nature of the usufructuary right is not in doubt, the precise
status of the ownership right to groundwater is less clear.
The doctrine of absolute ownership recognizes ownership of
groundwater by the owner of overlying land and places no restric-
tion upon the owner's right of use on his overlying land or elsewhere;
indeed, this doctrine considers the owner of the land to be the owner
of all the water in the underlying aquifer. In describing the English
doctrine (variously termed the common law rule or the doctrine of
absolute ownership) as it has existed in some parts of the United
States, Wells Hutchins states: 1 8
14. Northern India Canal and Drainage Act 1873 (as amended and applied in Punjab and
Haryana), Chandigarh: Jain Law Agency (1968). This basic enactment also applies to Uttar
Pradesh.
15. For further discussion, see Wahi, Irrigation Management in Punjab in CENTRAL
BOARD OF IRRIGATION AND POWER (India), SYMPOSIUM ON MANAGEMENT OF
IRRIGATION WATERS 40-48 (1969); and Reidinger, supra note 4.
16. Government of India, Planning Commission, Committee on Plan Projects, Minor
Irrigation Team, Report on State Tubewells (Uttar Pradesh) 70-72 (1961).
17. UNITED NATIONS, WATER RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT CENTRE, LARGE-
SCALE GROUND WATER DEVELOPMENT, at 40 and elsewhere (1960).
18. Wells A. Hutchins, Reasonable Beneficial Use in the Development of Ground-Water
Law in the West in Committee on the Economics of Water Resources Development of the
Western Agricultural Economics Research Council and Western Regional Research Commit-
tee, Ground Water Economics and the Law, Report No. 5, at 24 (1956).
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In its original form, this theory accords exclusive property rights in
the water to the landowner; it gives him the right to pump out the
water at any time and in any quantity, for any legitimate enterprise,
either on or off the overlying land. Various courts have imposed
qualifications on this unlimited right, chiefly by way of requiring the
water to be used without malice or negligence, or without unneces-
sary waste. But if the effect of heavy pumping by a landowner, while
engaged in any legitimate enterprise that meets these requirements,
is to exhaust the ground water supply of his neighbor by drawing all
the water from the substrata of the latter's tract into his own heavily
pumped well, it cannot become the ground of an action.
A recent irrigation report in India implicitly acknowledged the exis-
tence of the common law rule of absolute ownership of percolating
ground water by the overlying landowner.' I This report stated that,
according to the custom in vogue in India, the ownership of ground-
water rested with the owner of overlying land and there was no
restriction upon the owner's rights of use of the water on his over-
lying land. 2 1
There is a major qualification, however, to the preceding interpre-
tation of groundwater rights in northern India which arises because
of India's unique agrarian structure-in particular, its imperfectly
developed system of private ownership of agricultural land. A reason-
ably strong case can be made that a proprietary or ownership right in
land-and, by analogy, in groundwater-in northern India does not
amount to complete or full ownership. The rights of property in land
are regarded as a bundle or layering of rights2 I in which the "owner"
has many rights but in which the state has control of the uppermost
strand of the bundle. Thorner, for instance,, has argued :2 2
The key fact about all of the British land settlement of the late
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries . .. was that the new rights in
the land were invariably subordinated to the rights of the State. To
19. Government of India, Ministry of Food, Agriculture, Community Development and
Cooperation, Report of the Working Group for Formulation of Fourth Five Year Plan
Proposals on Minor Irrigation and Rural Electricification 89-90 (1968).
20. Not all irrigation officials in India espoused this view of ground water rights. Some
irrigation officials in Punjab (private interviews, Chandigarh, November, 1969) considered
that the owner of overlying land had only a right to make use of ground water and was not
the owner of the "corpus" of water which lies in the aquifer. Some officials were inclined,
in fact, to view ground water rights as riparian rights-an understandable misinterpretation,
given the temptation to draw an analogy between ground water and surface water.
21. See S. CIRIACY-WANTRUP, RESOURCE CONSERVATION: ECONOMICS AND
POLICIES 139-149 (3rd ed. 1968) for a discussion of the nature and importance of prop-
erty rights as a primary social institution in the development and use of resources. In
particular, note his reference to property as a "bundle" of rights in the use and transfer of
natural resources.
22. D. THORNER, THE AGRARIAN PROSPECT IN INDIA 7 (1956).
[Vol. 18
WATER POLICY AND WATER INSTITUTIONS
no holder was granted the exclusive right to occupy, enjoy, and
dispose of land which, in practice, is the hallmark of Western private
ownership. ... Some of the rights normally associated with private
property in land (e.g., transfer, mortgageability, heritability) were
indeed accorded to the new "owners." But their privileges were
restricted by the simultaneous recognition of rights both superior
and inferior to their own in the same land. The State, as a super-
landlord (or ultimate owner), claimed d share of the rents; while the
actual tillers exercised a traditional claim to occupancy.
There are convincing historical reasons, therefore, why property
rights in land in India should be regarded as a blend of remnants
from the past and modern Western concepts of private property. In
particular, the claim of the state as an ultimate owner has descended
from the claim of ancient Hindu and Mughul dynasties to a share of
the produce of the land. This was reinforced, in days of British rule,
by the claim of the imperial power to payment of land revenue. In
independent India, land revenue must still be paid by several state
governments.
With reference to groundwater, a plausible case can be made that
since ownership rights in groundwater are derived from ownership
rights in land, a similar hierarchical structure of rights in groundwater
exists. One can postulate that the individual farmer has control of
most of the bundle of rights relating to groundwater-he can use
it, sell it with his land, or pass it on to his heirs with his land.
However, the state could be regarded as being the "ultimate owner"
of groundwater in the same sense that the state is the "ultimate
owner" of land.
From the preceding discussion of groundwater rights, it seems
clear, therefore, that it is a misnomer to call groundwater in India a
common property resource. The most satisfying definition of the
common property concept is that which refers to "a distribution of
property rights in resources in which a number of owners are co-
equal in their rights to use the resource." '2 3 Inherent in this defini-
tion is the fact that a common owner does not have the right to
23. Ciriacy-Wantrup & Bishop, supra note 3, at 714. This definition has a basis in legal-
historical tradition and is compatible with the concept of common property as outlined in
Juergensmeyer & Wadley, The Common Land Concept: A "Commons" Solution to a Com-
mon Environmental Problem, 14 NAT. RES. J. 361 (1974). A major problem with Dorf-
man's conceptualization of common property (supra note 11, at 7) is that he errs in
suggesting this concept makes no reference to property rights. The difficulty with Fisher
and Krutilla's discussion of a common property resource (Managing the Public Lands: Assign-
ment of Property Rights and Valuation of Resources, with subsequent comment by Marion
Clawson, in THE GOVERNANCE OF COMMON PROPERTY RESOURCES, supra note 9,
at 35) is that they mistakenly equate a common property resource with an open access
resource and suggest that common property is invariably overused.
I
July 1978]
NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL
transfer the resource. Such a situation of common ownership 2 4 does
not prevail for groundwater in India: Groundwater is not, at least at
this point in time, a true common property resource (res communes).
Nor is it fruitful to regard groundwater as an open access resource:
the right to pump water is restricted to those who own land over the
aquifer. Moreover, as Dorfman points out, it is misleading to say that
difficulties arise in the alleged common property situation because
there are no property rights or because they are ill defined; typically,
and certainly in the case of groundwater in India, nothing could be
further from the truth.2 s There are clearly established property
rights to groundwater, subject to the qualification that the upper-
most strand of the bundle of property rights might be construed as
belonging to the state, and the remaining rights of ownership and use
are vested in the hands of individual private farmers.
The groundwater resource in northern India is best regarded, in
the interests of conceptual and terminological clarity, as a fugitive
resource for which (essentially) private property rights exist. How-
ever, these private rights of ownership and use are indefinite for the
individual user because other pumpers may take possession of the
mobile resource in the meantime.2 6 Resource tenure is not defi-
nite2 1 in the case where hundreds of separate owners have land
overlying a common groundwater basin and where control of the
groundwater resource is essentially vested in the landowners. In
these circumstances, the motivation of the individual resource user is
to exploit the resource as quickly as possible so that the fluid and
mobile resource will not be captured by others.2 I The paramount
significance of indefiniteness of property rights is that it can lead to
resource depletion over time, although wasteful depletion of ground-
water is not yet an apparent problem in northern India. However, in
the absence of effective social institutions to guide resource use,
24. It should be noted that common property is not synonymous with public property.
In fact, in the United States, "contrary to widespread belief, common lands are private and
not public property," Juergensmeyer & Wadley, supra note 23, at 376.
25. Dorfman, supra note 11, at 7-9.
26. "Indefiniteness of property rights" occurs for that class of resources which must be
reduced to physical possession by the user before they are legally owned. Such resources are
termed "fugitive" because they must be captured through use. For further discussion, see S.
CIRIACY-WNATRUP, supra note 21, at 141-5.
27. It should be noted that a distinction is being drawn, somewhat arbitrarily, between
resources with poorly defined property rights and resources with indefinite property rights.
28. Definite property rights belong only to those who are in possession-that is,
who gets there "fastest with the mostest." Every user tries to protect himself
against others by acquiring ownership through capture in the fastest possible
way. Deferred use is always subject to a great uncertainty: others may capture
the resource in the meantime.
CIRIACY-WANTRUP, supra note 21, at 142.
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private groundwater use can be predicted eventually to generate
excessive investment and extraction costs; induce a pumping rate
which is greater than socially optimal and which may lead to irrever-
sible depletion; dissipate economic rent or producers' surplus; and, in
general, create economic waste or resource inefficiency.2 9
The conceptual clarification that groundwater should be regarded
as a fugitive, rather than as a common property, resource is impor-
tant as a basis for the development and management of the ground-
water resource. To view groundwater in northern India as a common
property resource might lead to complacency and unfruitful efforts
with respect to its regulation. Common property as an institution
frequently facilitates the setting up of a regulatory framework to
guide resource use.3 0 In northern India, any groundwater regulatory
scheme must take cognizance of the fact that private property rights
in groundwater exist and that an institutional basis for management
may be difficult to achieve.
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE PERFORMANCE OF THE SYSTEM OF
GROUND WATER RIGHTS IN TERMS OF SECURITY AND FLEXIBILITY
A useful conceptual approach which has been suggested for the
examination of the performance of a system of water rights and for
the analysis of problems which might be associated with that system
involves the concepts of "security" and "flexibility" of the water
rights system.3 1 In the analysis of current and anticipated social
performance of groundwater rights, the concepts of security and
flexibility are regarded as intervening criteria which serve to maintain
and to increase national income under constantly changing condi-
tions.3 2 Security of water rights is especially significant for water
development, whereas flexibility of water rights is important for
water allocation among users, uses, and regions.
29. See Haveman, Common Property, Congestion and Environmental Pollution, 38 Q. J.
ECON. 278 (1973).
30. Ciriacy-Wantrup, supra note 12.
31. Ciriacy-Wantrup, Concepts Used as Economic Criteria for a System of Water Rights,
in ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC POLICY IN WATER RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT 251
(Smith & Castle eds. 1964). In this analytical framework, institutions such as ground water
rights are conceptualized as social decision systems on the second level of a three level
hierarchy and they can be analyzed with respect to their structure, functioning, and perfor-
mance, see Ciriacy-Wantrup, Water Policy and Economic Optimizing: Some Conceptual
Problems in Water Research, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 179 (1967).
32. Ciriacy-Wantrup, Concepts Used as Economic Criteria for a System of Water Rights,
supra note 31, at 268. In their adaptation of this conceptual approach to the appraisal of
water rights in Arizona, Kelso, Martin, and Mack emphasize:
Two aspects of water rights most significant for an understanding of man's
behaviour relative to water and to one another over water are: (1) the security
of their expectations that whatever rights they hold to water and its use will
July 19781
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The two main facets of security are physical security and tenure
security. 3 3 Groundwater rights, from the point of view of physical
certainty, are reasonably secure. The holder of groundwater rights in
northern India has a reasonable degree of certainty that the physical
supply of water available to him will not be affected by the vagaries
of nature. This degree of security is partially the result of the fact
that groundwater can be stored in the underground aquifer from
season to season and from year to year. For instance, in years of
heavy monsoon rains and above average recharge, any recharged
water in excess of the average is stored in the aquifer and is available for
use in another year when recharge is below normal. The degree of
physical security varies somewhat among landowners, depending on
such factors as local differences in depth to the water table, the
transmission properties of the aquifer, and local variations in the
"draw-down" or "cone of depression" in the water table during
pumping.3 4
The major problem, however, with groundwater rights in northern
India centers on the question of tenure security. Though not a prob-
lem in the short run, groundwater rights are insecure with respect to
the certainty of tenure over the long run. Given the present nature of
groundwater rights, there is no protection for the individual right
holder against variability over time of the quantity (or, for that
matter, the quality) of water usable under the right due to the lawful
acts of others. In some respects, however, the groundwater right can
be construed as being secure with respect to certainty of tenure. The
landowner in northern India has a largely unrestrained right of access
to groundwater which lies beneath his land; that right is not lost
through non-use. The landowner is not yet protected against un-
reasonable use or water export by his neighbor, although this is a
possible direction in which groundwater law might evolve, as it has in
the southwestern United States.
be stable and dependable over time, and (2) the flexibility permitted to them
to effect changes in use and location of use of the water covered by their
rights, and to acquire and transfer water rights from and to others. .. . Secu-
rity and flexibility are the twin essences of socially efficient property rela-
tions.
See M. KELSO, W. MARTIN & L. MACK, WATER SUPPLIES AND ECONOMIC GROWTH
IN AN ARID ENVIRONMENT: AN ARIZONA CASE STUDY, 52 & 54 (1973).
33. Physical security is concerned with "protection against physical uncertainty, that is,
against variability over time of the quantity of water usable under the right due to seasonal
or annual variability of natural runoff and groundwater recharge"; on the other hand, tenure
security is concerned with "protection against uncertainty of water tenure, that is, protec-
tion against variability over time of the quantity of water usable under the right due to
lawful acts of other individuals or groups, private or public." Ciriacy-Wantrup, supra note
31, at 253.
34. M. KELSO, W. MARTIN & L. MACK, supra note 32, at 67.
[Vol. 18
WATER POLICY AND WATER INSTITUTIONS
Currently in northern India, so long as annual draft does not ex-
ceed recharge, farmers are relatively secure with respect to certainty
of tenure. In the long run, however, tenure rights to groundwater are
particularly insecure given the distinct possibility that collective ex-
traction from the common aquifer will exceed recharge. This insecu-
rity is enhanced by the unrestrained right of the individual farmer to
pump all the water he needs; he has no liability of any kind to other
overlying owners for any adverse effects on water availability caused
by his pumping.
The most pertinent economic implication of security of ground-
water rights is its relationship to investment in groundwater develop-
ment and its consequent impact on the extraction of groundwater.' '
Normally, when rights to a resource are insecure and a rights holder
is unprotected against uncertainties in the income flow which the
resource generates, aggregate investment in the development of the
resource tends to be depressed. The case of groundwater is an excep-
tion to this general rule.
Despite the considerable potential for tenure insecurity with re-
spect to the groundwater resource in northern India, investment in
groundwater development can be anticipated to be stimulated due to
the indefinite nature of property rights for this fugitive resource.
Each farmer tries to protect himself against the lawful acts of
others by aquiring ownership through capture in the fastest possible
way. As a result, aggregate investment in the extraction of the re-
source is stimulated3 6 and there is a motivation for depletion, rather
than conservation, of the resource.3 I
The second intervening criteria by which a system of groundwater
rights might be appraised is flexibility. Flexibility primarily focuses
on the relative ease of transferability, both voluntary and involun-
tary, between uses and users. Groundwater rights in northern India
are inflexible in some respects and flexible in others: Inflexible, in
that the voluntary transfer of groundwater rights requires the con-
comitant transfer of land and in that there is no market in ground-
water rights per se; flexible, in that the sale of surplus groundwater
by one farmer to his nearby neighbors is permitted and encouraged
35. Ciriacy-Wantrup, supra note 31, at 258-60.
36. Investment in ground water has primarily increased in northern India, of course,
because such investment is characterized by a reasonable degree of divisibility, a relatively
short gestation period, and, most significantly of all, a short "pay-off period" given the
enhanced profitability of the new high-yielding varieties used in conjunction with assured
supplies of fertilizer and water.
37. The discussion in this section on the economic implications of security of ground
water rights does not imply that water management in northern India should suddenly be
redirected toward policies of conservation rather than depletion.
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and in that a groundwater pumper has considerable leeway with
respect to the use to which he puts groundwater on his farm. So long
as the predominant use of groundwater is agricultural, no major
flexibilities should arise. However, inflexibilities in water allocation
will likely occur as greater urbanization and industrialization occur,
because, since the groundwater right is currently tied to the land
base, there may be difficulties in satisfying the future increasing
demands of non-agricultural, urban, and industrial users.
The most significant conclusions which emerge from an analysis of
the security and flexibility of the system of groundwater rights in
northern India are the following: groundwater rights are relatively
secure against physical uncertainty but relatively insecure, particu-
larly in the long run, with respect to certainty of tenure; the indefi-
niteness of property rights associated with a fugitive resource such as
groundwater leads to its rapid development and, perhaps, depletion;
and groundwater rights, while not posing a problem for water alloca-
tion at the moment, may prove increasingly inflexible as regions such
as Punjab progressively develop.3 I
There are convincing reasons to conclude that the performance of
the current system of groundwater rights will prove increasingly
inadequate over time. Due to its inherent tenure uncertainty and
potential for inflexibility, the current system of groundwater rights
will tend to impede, rather than facilitate, increases in national in-
come in the long run. As a consequence, a critical area in public
water policy in northern India is the question of revision of the
current water law involving groundwater rights.
ANALYSIS OF WELL INTERFERENCE AND OVERDRAFT
Since the beginning of the green revolution, water table levels in
most irrigation tracts in the Punjab region have declined.3 I Typi-
cally, many groundwater problems, ranging from localized, well fail-
ure to a generalized decline in water table levels, are labeled "over-
draft." In the analysis of current and future overdraft problems, six
38. Such problems are currently manifest in other regions of India, notably in the more
poorly endowed ground water basins of southern India. In the Coimbatore region of the
state of Tamil Nadu, for instance, ground water depletion was already a very serious prob-
lem in the 1960's. The water table in the Coimbatore ground water basin is declining by
approximately two feet per year. Individual farmers attempt to maintain their supply of
water from huge open wells, often 125 feet deep, by laboriously removing another two or
three feet of stone per year.
39. Uppal, Serious Waterlogging in Punjab and Haryana-How Cured and Measures to
Prevent its Recurrence in CENTRAL BOARD OF IRRIGATION AND POWER (India),
SYMPOSIUM ON WATERLOGGING-CAUSES AND MEASURES FOR ITS PREVEN-
TION, vol. II, 1 (1972).
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types of overdraft can be conceptually distinguished: local or
pseudo-overdraft (localized well interference); developmental or
shortrun overdraft; seasonal or annual overdraft; cyclical or periodic
overdraft; secular or long run overdraft; and, finally, critical over-
draft.4 Though not yet widespread, problems of local overdraft are
anticipated to intensify in the Punjab region. Local overdraft occurs
when pumping by one user affects the conditions of production
experienced by neighboring users, primarily through the influence of
the cone of depression created by withdrawal. This effect, however,
is localized in nature and is not associated with a general decline in
water table levels in the groundwater basin.
The current decline of water table levels in the Punjab region is
characterized by developmental overdraft-a phase of groundwater
development in which draft on the groundwater stock lowers the
water table sufficiently to permit a greater degree of utilization of
the storage capacity of the aquifer. Developmental overdraft, then, is
not only a necessary, but also a socially useful, stage in groundwater
development and use. It allows man to take complete advantage of
both the stock and flow components of the groundwater resource.
Furthermore, it helps to prevent natural discharge through evapora-
tion and the associated problems of salinity and alkalinity.
Seasonal and cyclical overdraft are present to some extent in Pun-
jab, but they appear to be relatively unimportant to the ground-
water economy of the region. The potential problems of secular and
critical overdraft, however, pose serious policy concerns. Long run or
secular overdraft refers to the continual mining of the groundwater
stock which occurs when annual draft perennially exceeds average
annual recharge. Though not necessarily reducing economic welfare,
long run overdraft typically imposes significant social costs on
society. One kind of immoderate social loss to be avoided is the
irreversible destruction of the storage capacity of the aquifer which
can occur when sustained long run overdraft leads to compaction of
the aquifer. 4' Long run overdraft typically occurs in semi-arid en-
vironments as the needs or irrigated agriculture outstrip a limited
water supply.
The emerging groundwater problems in the Punjab region can also
be analyzed in terms of cost and revenue interrelationships associated
with groundwater use. The problem of local overdraft (or well inter-
ference), for example, can be conceived as a problem of cost and
.40. J. Snyder, Ground Water in California: The Experience of Antelope Valley (Giannini
Foundation Ground Water Studies No. 2, Berkeley, 1955).
41. See CIRIACY-WANTRUP, supra note 21, chs. 3 & 18, for a discussion of depletion
problems associated with flow resources with critial zones.
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revenue relations between users of groundwater.4 2 Use of ground-
water by two pumpers is competitive in costs because an increase in
use by one pumper leads to an increase in marginal costs of pumping
for the second pumper. In addition, where local overdraft occurs,
there is a problem concerning the incidence of costs and revenues.4 3
The private pumper whose extraction of water causes drawdown in
nearby wells bears only his private costs of additional withdrawal.
Part of the cost of additional pumping is imposed on neighboring
users whose conditions of pumping are adversely affected. In these
circumstances, the private marginal costs of pumping by the individ-
ual user are less than the social marginal costs-a classic case of a
technological external diseconomy.
The problem of long run overdraft, on the other hand, can be
conceived as a question of cost and revenue relations over time-that
is, relationships between rates of use of the groundwater resource in
different planning intervals.4 4 Overpumping or the "mining" of
groundwater means that rates of use of the resource are competitive
in costs because an increase in the use rate in one interval increases
the marginal costs of the rate of use in a second interval. In other
words, current and future rates of groundwater use are interrelated
because excessive extraction in a current period increases the mar-
ginal costs of extraction in a future period. As water tables drop, the
marginal cost of pumping from greater depths increases.
Although cost and revenue relations over time can arise without
fugitiveness, the fact that groundwater in northern India is a fugitive
resource strengthens the case that use rates will be interrelated over
time. Where resource tenure is indefinite, as previously discussed, it is
in the self-interest of each pumper to bring as much water to surface
as quickly as possible. Consequently, resource users tend to ignore
the possible future value of the resource, thus mining it too rap-
idly.4 The individual pumper is motivated, moreover, to develop
additional wells, to expand the rate of pumping from existing wells,
or to invest in deepening existent wells and substituting more sophis-
ticated pumping equipment as the water table recedes due to secular
overdraft. The end results of groundwater pumpers attempting to
capture the resource in the fastest possible way are that the average
42. See id. at 43-45 and 381 for a discussion of cost and revenue relations between uses
(or users) and between resources.
43. Id. at 235-38.
44. Id. at 66-75 and 381.
45. J. Bredehoeft & R. Young, Two Studies in Water Resources Management 3-7 (RFF
Reprint No. 103, 1972). In other words, resource users tend to ignore "user cost" prin-
ciples.
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and marginal costs of pumping in the groundwater sector are in-
creased and the resource may be allocated inefficiently over time.
POLICY IMPLICATIONS WITH RESPECT TO GROUNDWATER LAW
The preceding discussion of the existing system of groundwater
rights and the outline and analysis of emerging groundwater prob-
lems in the Punjab region point to the impending necessity for public
policy with respect to groundwater development and use in northern
India. Through formulation of a policy, the present system of ground-
water rights can be altered to improve its degree of security. Public
policy is needed to remedy the potential for wasteful depletion
caused by indefiniteness of property rights in groundwater, and to
deal with the more immediate problem of local overdraft or well
interference, as well as to set the foundation to combat eventual long
run overdraft. Such policy will require the modification and adjudi-
cation of water rights, the integration of surface water and ground-
water development, and the framing of appropriate groundwater reg-
ulations. 4 6
A policy approach to the revision of groundwater rights which
could prove useful in the solution of emerging groundwater prob-
lems in northern India involves the modification of the existing sys-
tem of rights in line with the doctrine of correlative rights which has
evolved out of the Californian experience.4 7 In this evolution, the
essence of the system of riparian rights for surface water was grafted
on to the system of groundwater rights in the situation where the
common law rule of absolute ownership was proving untenable for
the environmental and economic conditions of California. Beginning
with the case of Katz v. Walkinshaw in 1902-03, 8 the common law
rule was either modified or repudiated and replaced by the doctrine
of correlative rights.4 9 The doctrine of correlative rights "must be
regarded as a direct descendant of riparian law" and riparian law, in
turn, is based on the concept of common property.50 It is ironic that
rather than common property being the cause of groundwater prob-
lems in northern India, common property-related institutions might
prove promising in their solutions.
The chief feature of the California correlative doctrine is that
46. Ciriacy-Wantrup, supra note 2, at 1322.
47. The discussion of the Californian doctrine of correlative rights is based on W.
HUTCHINS, THE CALIFORNIA LAW OF WATER RIGHTS (1956) and Ciriacy-Wantrup,
Some Economic Issues in Water Rights, 37 J. FARM ECON. 875 (1955).
48. 141 Cal. 116, 70 P.663 (1902), 74 P.766 (1903).
49. W. HUTCHINS, supra note 47, at 431.
50. Ciriacy-Wantrup & Bishop, supra note 3, at 722.
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owners of all lands that overlie a common supply of percolating
groundwater have correlative and coequal rights to the reasonable
beneficial use of the water of that supply on or in connection with
their overlying lands. Furthermore, in the event that the demand for
groundwater based on coequal rights exceeds the supply and some
form of rationing among the overlying landowners is necessary, the
water may be apportioned by court decree (adjudication) among
them in accordance with their respective reasonable beneficial needs
and in proportion to their historical use. For instance, in the ser-
iously overdrawn Raymond Basin in southern California, the prin-
ciple of water rationing among landowners in accordance with "safe
yield" of the basin was established in the case of Pasadena v. Al-
ham bra. 5 1
The correlative rights doctrine has several attractive features.
Under this doctrine, the vested rights of overlying owners are par-
tially protected. The doctrine does not ensure complete security of
water supply for each pumper (in line, for instance, with historic
levels of pumping). But the fact that each groundwater user is en-
titled to his reasonable share of the total water supply when the
supply is insufficient to meet the needs of all users means that certainty
of tenure with respect to groundwater use has been substantially
increased. The ownership of groundwater under the correlative
rights doctrine is considered to lie in that part of the public com-
prising the owners of all overlying lands; individual landowners have
(private) rights of use based upon their ownership of the overlying
land but not private ownership in the water itself until it has been
reduced to actual possession.' 2 This altered ownership status under
the doctrine of correlative rights has two significant implications.
First, a basis for the public regulation of groundwater can be estab-
lished. Second, given that the correlative right to groundwater is in
many respects analogous to the riparian right to surface water, an
effective institutional basis for the integration of the development
and use of surface and groundwater is also established. Since most
surface water in northern India is allocated through the canal system
and is not directly diverted by individual riparian landowners under
the riparian rights system, it is important to note that correlative
rights to groundwater, Once adjudicated, could be integrated with the
rotational time-turn associated with canal water deliveries.
51. 33 Cal.2d 908, 207 P.2d 17 (1949), cert. denied sub nom. California-Michigan Land
& Water Co. v. Pasadena, 339 U.S. 937 (1950); see W. HUTCHINS, supra note 47, at
444-46.
52. Id. at 428.
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The transformation of groundwater rights to a correlative rights
system, therefore, could be accomplished without explicit statutory
declaration that ground water in India was public property. The
California alternative also has practical appeal because it bypasses the
problems of confiscation of private property and of compensation
that might be associated with eminent domain procedures. The doc-
trine of correlative rights has certain advantages, too, over an appro-
priation doctrine that might be legislatively based on the "police
powers" of the state. Under an appropriation system,' I prospective
groundwater users apply to a public agency for the right to pump a
specific quantity of water. Respective claims to water at a point in
time are typically judged in terms of a preference ordering for var-
ious uses (municipal, agricultural, industrial, recreational). Once
appropriation is completed, the time element alone confers preferen-
tial rights. A considerable disadvantage of an appropriate system of
water rights is, then, that it may impede flexibility in the use of
water in the course of economic change. For instance, in the event of
a water shortage, a senior (in time) appropriative right for a relatively
low-valued use of water would not yield to a junior right for a
higher-valued use.
A further advantage of the correlative doctrine is that it might
more readily accommodate the future use of groundwater by small
landowners who do not currently use groundwater. The correlative
right, like the riparian right, does not depend upon use and is typi-
cally not lost by disuse. A considerable disadvantage of zoning regu-
lations which prohibit further wells in certain tracts or of appropria-
tion type doctrines ("first in time, first in right") could be their
rigidity with respect to accommodating the needs of small farmers
over time. Finally, the correlative doctrine, as developed in Cali-
fornia, is generally regarded to have facilitated the development of
both groundwater and surface water in the course of economic
change.5 4
Undeniably, there would be difficulties in attempting to modify
the existing system of groundwater rights in northern India in accor-
dance with the correlative rights doctrine. One problem might lie in
the difficulties of finding a relatively cheap and effective method of
adjudication of water rights among a great many small farm owners
in a particular groundwater sub-basin. A further problem is the need
for appropriate water organizations or water management institu-
53. For further discussion of the appropriation doctrine of water rights, see HUTCHINS
and Ciriacy-Wantrup, supra note 47.
54. Ciriacy-Wantrup, supra note 47, at 879.
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tions to manage an integrated water rights and water resources sys-
tem.' I These difficulties, however, should prove surmountable.
With the establishment of an integrated water rights and manage-
ment system, an effective institutional basis for the promulgation of
groundwater regulations would exist. Groundwater regulations are
needed to combat such emerging problems as localized interference
between wells or the potential of long run overdraft. The choice of
instruments or tools in ground water regulation depends considerably
on the specific problem at hand. Well spacing, for example, is an
effective means of dealing with the problem of localized interference
between wells. In this situation, which is characterized by cost and
revenue relations between users, a policy tool with spatial character-
istics is particularly well suited to mitigate spatial relationships
between users.5 6 On the other hand, well spacing is an inappropriate
policy instrument to deal with secular overdraft which is character-
ized by cost and revenue relations over time. A more effective tool
for dealing with overdraft would be restriction on the volume of
water pumped in combination with limitation on the number of
wells. An indirect means of alleviating an overdraft problem would
involve groundwater laws for the provision and operation of recharge
facilities, which would increase the rate of replenishment.
In the Punjab region of northern India, the problem of localized
interference between wells is the most immediate groundwater prob-
lem. Groundwater regulations involving rules for well spacing should
be a priority policy concern.
CONCLUDING COMMENTS
The use of groundwater in northern India now requires the develop-
ment of effective water institutions. In order to deal with emerging
groundwater problems in northern India and to establish a basis for
the regulation and management of groundwater, the existing system
of groundwater rights must be modified and revised. The English
rule of absolute ownership will prove increasingly ill-suited to the
environmental and economic conditions of northern India as progres-
sively more water is needed to extend and modernize irrigated agri-
culture. Therefore, the existing system of groundwater rights should
be re-oriented towards a system of correlative rights, rather than
towards a system of appropriative rights. Under a correlative rights
55. See Veeman, supra initial note, ch. 8 for a discussion of public water districts as
potential water management organizations in northern India.
56. See CIRIACY-WANTRUP, supra note 21, ch. 19 for a discussion of the economic
characteristics of zoning.
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system, individual groundwater pumpers would retain private rights
of use to a reasonable share of the groundwater supply. Moreover, an
effective institutional basis for the public regulation of groundwater,
as well as for the integration of use of ground- and surface water,
would be established. Without the development of appropriate water
policy and water institutions, the full potential of the new cereal
technology will not be realized in northern India.
